‘Schedule over safety’: Boeing whistleblower Pierson raises alarm on aircraft quality

The Air India Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner crash on June 12 has once again put Boeing’s safety culture under intense scrutiny, reviving long-standing concerns about production pressure, compromised quality checks and inadequate testing of aircraft components.

From the two Boeing 737 Max crashes in 2018 and 2019 to the catastrophic 787 crash in Ahmedabad, a series of aviation disasters has claimed hundreds of lives, raising fundamental questions about whether commercial priorities have repeatedly overridden safety considerations.

‘Schedule was king’ inside Boeing factories

Explaining what he describes as Boeing’s “schedule-first” culture, former Boeing senior manager-turned-whistleblower and current Executive Director of the
Foundation for Aviation Safety Ed Pierson told Firstpost that production timelines consistently took precedence over safety on the factory floor.

While the company publicly maintains that safety and quality come first, Pierson said the reality inside Boeing’s manufacturing facilities often tells a different story.

“There was incredible pressure to get the work done. The schedule was king, as they always say at Boeing. The company says that safety and quality come first, but when it gets down to brass tacks, unfortunately, it’s not the same on the factory floor,” he said.

Pierson added that priorities varied sharply across teams, with some refusing to cut corners while others, under different leadership, made decisions that compromised safety.

Rushed production and ‘out-of-sequence’ work

Pierson described what he called a dangerous pattern of “out-of-sequence work” at Boeing, where aircraft moved down the production line despite incomplete tasks.

“For example, on a particular flow day like four, employees have to wait till the plane parts come or the quality control. If things are not available on time, they leave the work without completing it. They carry the same work on flow day five or six, which interrupts the work of those days,” he said.

He added that instead of pausing production, aircraft were routinely pushed forward, forcing workers to rush once parts eventually arrived.

“Instead of waiting until the parts come in, planes keep getting moved down the line, and after that, workers get the parts. They then have to rush to pick up their tools and do everything. It is downright dangerous,” Pierson said.

“When you hear about rate increases, these are on top of people who are struggling with quality control.”

Boeing’s cultural problem: ‘People need to speak up’

Pierson stressed that Boeing’s problems go beyond engineering failures and point to a deeper corporate culture issue. He said he had raised similar concerns during the manufacturing of the 737 Max aircraft.

He argued that safety responsibilities should not rest solely with pilots but extend across the workforce.

“Several times, when we talk about human factors, people think about pilots only. No, but even a mechanic, a technician, a flight attendant needs to speak up if they’re not in the right state of mind or physically ready to work because these planes will be out there for 30 years,” he said.

Leadership failures, Pierson added, compounded the problem. “Some areas have strong leadership, and then next door, it is terrible.”

‘Safety should be a higher priority, not Wall Street’

Asked whether Boeing’s current crisis is driven by rate pressure, Pierson pointed to what he called “artificial pressure” linked to financial losses.

“Boeing has lost a lot of capital and money because of the problems it faced in the last few years. At the company, it’s an artificial pressure in many ways,” he said.

Pierson argued that acknowledging manufacturing and quality control failures would be the first step towards rebuilding trust.

“Ensure your financial future by putting out high-quality products. If products are faulty, fix them first. This should be a higher priority than making new planes. They need to build the planes to the highest quality standards,” he said.

He added, “Problems exist, acknowledge it. If they keep denying and saying that we have the highest engineering standards, quality control standards, regulatory oversight, manufacturing standards…but the proof is in the pudding.”

Pierson also criticised Boeing’s focus on investor confidence over safety. “It doesn’t suit anybody to allow potentially dangerous planes to be flying and then be focused on Wall Street. Who cares what Wall Street says? Build planes with the highest quality standards. There’s always going to be a schedule, but if they cut corners, bad things will happen.”

‘Criminal accountability is necessary’

Pierson argued that meaningful reform at Boeing would not happen without criminal accountability for senior decision-makers.

“I absolutely think that criminal accountability is necessary to drive real change at Boeing. Nobody wakes up with the wrong intentions, but there is gross negligence,” he said.

He continued, “Pushing forward, getting the schedule done, putting planes out of the door to meet delivery dates, so the company can make all these public relations announcements about the numbers of planes being pushed. I think this is criminal behaviour.”

Pierson urged US law enforcement agencies to intervene. “The FBI needs to step in with the Department of Justice. They need to weed out those individual leaders who made bad decisions knowing that something was dangerous, but continued,” he said.

“They all should be held accountable, criminally accountable. Once you have the accountability, then behaviour will change. However, if you keep rewarding the behaviour, it won’t ever change.”

Would he fly on a 737 Max or 787?

When asked whether he would personally fly on a Boeing 737 Max or a 787 today, Pierson was unequivocal.

“No, I will not fly on the 737 Max right now. We have a long list of reports on our website, Foundation for Aviation Safety. It shows all the defects that we’ve been tracking. There are engine load reduction device issues that cause smoke in the cabin and the flight deck. There are anti-icing systems that can cause the disintegration of a cowling on the engine. There’s a whole bunch of issues.”

He said similar concerns were emerging around the Dreamliner. “We’re finishing up an analysis on 787, and I can say that we have witnessed a lot of the similarities. The same bad manufacturing processes we saw on Max. We noticed those on the 787, as evident in these reports. I wouldn’t recommend flying on the 787 right now until the authorities do their job.”

“Incomplete production records and concealed information”

Addressing earlier comments about aircraft leaving factories with incomplete or inaccurate production records, Pierson cited the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash.

“The production records showed that the plane was having problems with the electrical system in the factory before it came out of the factory. But that information was not shared with investigators,” he said.

He said, “Stop concealing information because it doesn’t suit anybody. We need to listen to these victim family members. They demand justice and accountability. Some people are acting criminally today, and our law enforcement and justice system needs to hold them accountable.”

What Pierson wants Boeing to do next

Pierson said Boeing must begin by confronting unresolved defects across its aircraft programmes.

“Go back, look at all those defects on 737 and 787, that can be a good starting point,” he said.

“Focus on faults. Boeing needs to come up with a plan as soon as possible to fix all the 737 and 787 defects, which we have seen.”

He added that pressure from leadership continues to undermine safety. “They are not making sure employees are trained properly and certified to do the job. We get employees’ reports, even today. They are being asked to work on something they are not trained for, which is wrong.”

With the Ahmedabad crash marking yet another fatal chapter in Boeing’s history, Pierson warned that the company’s future now hinges on whether it chooses accountability over expediency.